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OBJECTION TO DEPENDANTS' STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Aurora objects to defendants' statement of the case to the
extent that it goes through a lengthy recitation of defendants'
view of what defendants claim transpired herein prior to the
trial court's entry of the previous final judgment on July 13,
2004. Without getting into what Aurora considers numerous errors
in that portion of their statement of the case, it is clear that
what may have transpired prior to the July 13, 2004 final
judgment is simply irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in
this appeal, and should be stricken or ignored by the appellate
court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS' INTERPRETATION OF RULE 54(d) IS COMPLETELY
UNSUPPORTED UNDER THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE
RULE OR ANY CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY DEFENDANTS
Defendants' assert that Aurora's interpretation of Rule
54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., does not harmonize the two subsections
of Rule 54(d) pertaining to costs, while their interpretation of
those subsections does. Defendants fail to articulate any
rational support for this bold declaration, for the simple reason
that there is none and defendants' interpretation is contrary to
"well-established" Utah law.
A.

The Express Language of Rule 54(d) Does Not Support

Defendants' Interpretation.
Rule 54(d) of our civil procedure rules is made up of two
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subsections. Subsection (d)(1) sets out who is entitled to seek
an award of costs, whereas subsection (d)(2) sets out the
procedure a party must follow in order to secure a cost award.
Defendants' entire argument to support their contention that
Rule 54(d) expressly allows a party to seek trial court costs
after an appeal is completed (in spite of the obvious
contradiction with the express language of subsection (2)), is
based on one clause contained in subsection (1), that is, "... ;
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review
is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection
with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the
final determination of the cause."
Under basic rules of interpreting our American-English
language, this clause qualifies the portion of the sentence which
precedes it, in this case, "Except when express provision
therefore is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs;" (immediately followed
by the clause quoted in the preceding paragraph). Thus, the
clause upon which defendants' hang their hats does not at all
qualify the express provisions of subsection (2) of Rule 54 as to
how a party must procedurally seek a cost award, but simply
means, completely consistent with Aurora's interpretation of the
rule, that we all recognize that when an appeal or other review
is pursued, the previously prevailing party may, after the
appellate decision, no longer be the "prevailing party" or
certain costs which were awarded may have been reversed in whole
2

or in part, and any final award of costs must be conformed to, or
"abide", the final determination. The use of the term "abide" in
itself suggests the necessity of there being an existing cost
award prior to the appeal.
Clearly, Aurora's interpretation harmonizes both subsections
of Rule 54(d) and defendants' interpretation completely
eviserates subsection (2) of Rule 54(d). When Rule 54(d)(2)
refers to the entry of judgment, it is referring the judgments
which are commonly designated as "final" under the provisions of
Rule 54(a) or (b) which dispose of either all of the claims of
all of the parties under R. 54(a) (as was the case herein), or
are certified as final as to one or more but fewer than all of
the claims or parties under R. 54(b), and that was the judgment
entered on July 13, 2004, not some "new final judgment" the
defendants conned the trial court into entering more than two
years after their request for costs were time-barred under the
express provisions of R. 54(d)(2).
It should be obvious to anyone that the requirement of R. 54
(d)(2) that the verified cost memorandum must be filed within
five days of entry of the final judgment is, at least in part,
structured that way to ensure that the courts are not wasting
judicial time and resources in a second appeal over the propriety
of a separate cost award, as defendants7 actions have
necessitated herein.
B. Cases Cited By Defendants Are Completely Inapposite to
the Issues Herein.
Defendants have cited a few cases in an attempt to support
3

their clearly untimely request for trial court costs. Not
surprisingly, none of the cited cases lend any support whatsoever
to defendants' position.
First, defendants cite the Utah case of Benjamin v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., Utah 2006, 140 P.3d 1210. Although defendants
acknowledge that the Benjamin case was merely an interlocutory
appeal, they go on to argue that the Benjamin Court's reasoning
should apply herein because both cases had not had a "final
determination" entered prior to the appeal. This assertion simply
ignores the point of the Benjamin opinion. The Benjamin Court
clearly rejected the request for costs because it was not dealing
with a final judgment, but with an interlocutory appeal, and
there could be no determination as to who was the prevailing
party, but the Court instructed the trial court to weigh the
insured's costs on the interlocutory appeal once "it can identify
the prevailing party." Id. at p. 1218. That is, once a final
judgment had been entered. Clearly, the Benjamin decision merely
stands for the proposition, in agreement with the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision on the same issue, that costs should not be
sought in connection with a petition for an interlocutory appeal
until there has been a final judgment entered and the prevailing
party is identifiable. Id. At that point, costs incurred on the
interlocutory appeal can be evaluated along with other cost
issues which arose prior to the entry of a final judgment. Thus,
Benjaminy supra, is simply inapposite to the issue in this case
where a final judgment had been entered on July 13, 2004. A brief
comment is appropriate on defendants' suggestion at the top of
4

page 21 of their brief that, "Thus, unlike in this case, in the
cases relied on by Aurora, there was no dispute about whether a
"final judgment" —

or, in the language of Rule 54(d)(1), a

"final determination" —

had been entered, and the issue was

therefore not before those courts." (Emphasis added.) This
attempt to suggest that there was, in fact, some dispute that the
July 13, 2004 Order was a final judgment from which "an appeal
lies," which defendants expounded upon through pages 21-22, is
patently false. It was clear to anyone that the July 13, 2004
Order striking Aurora's complaint as a discovery sanction was a
final judgment, triggering the five day time limit in which
defendants had to seek their trial costs under R. 54(d)(2).
Defendants themselves conceded in the prior appeal that the July
13, 2004 Order was "final" for purposes of appeal by conceding
the appellate court's jurisdiction thereon. Defendant's attempt
to suggest in their brief at p. 22 that the Order, which their
counsel drafted, had what were seemingly unnecessary, superfluous
provisions in it that defendants claim "suggested" that postappeal proceedings were anticipated, is simply irrelevant.
Whether post-appeal procedings were anticipated did not relieve
defendants of seeking their trial costs within five days of the
entry of the July 13, 2004 Order, which was clearly a "final
judgment." Defendants are merely attempting to confuse the issue
by using interchangably the terms "final judgment" and "final
determination of the cause." In actuality, "final judgment" is
the commonly used term for those judgments, orders or decrees
from which an appeal lies under R. 54(a) & (b), whereas the
5

phrase "final determination of the cause" is simply used in
R.54(d)(1) to indicate that stage of litigation proceedings after
an appeal has been decided which may alter the trial court's
initial determination as to who the prevailing party is. The
terms, as used in R. 54(d), are clearly not the same, and do not
refer to the same stage of the proceedings.
Second, defendants cite a couple cases from Florida, one
from Maryland and one from Alabama to support their claim that
Utah's Rule 54(d) allows a party to wait until after an appeal to
apply for trial court costs. Those cases are again simply
inapposite to this case, and offer no support to defendants7
position.
Of course, when citing decisions from foreign jurisdictions
to support a particular interpretation of Utah procedural law, it
is incumbent on the propounding party to demonstrate why these
foreign decisions should be persuasive to the Utah court, which
is generally done by showing the similarity of, if not outright
identical, language of the two state's statutory or procedural
provisions. Of course, defendants provide no comparison of the
respective rules pertaining to awards of trial costs. A more
careful look into the cases cited by defendants and those states'
procedural rules reveals why: those states'procedural rules
either are not or were not at the time of the cited decisions
similar to Utah's.
In the case from Alabama, Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804
(Ala.Civ.App.1998), Alabama's Rule 54(d) is like that of the
federal rules, that is, without any express time limit as to when
6

a motion for costs must be pursued, and the Hinson Court, citing
prior Alabama case authority, concluded that since the assessment
of costs under Alabama law may be done at any time prior to
issuance of execution, the pendency of an appeal was immaterial
to the question of the timeliness of the motion for assessment of
costs. Thus, the Hinson decision is completely inapposite to the
issue herein because of Utah's express time limitation for filing
for trial costs.
In the Maryland case, Litty v. Becker, 656 A.2d 365 (Md.App.
1995), the court was dealing with interpreting a statute which
imposes costs as a sanction under standards similar to federal
Rule 11. However, the decision was based upon the fact that the
Maryland rule at issue "contains no time limit for filing a
motion for costs." Id. at p. 369. Thus, the Maryland court
concluded that the only time limitation on such a cost request
was the equitable consideration of whether considering such a
motion "would unduly prejudice the non-moving party." Id. at p.
368.
As to the Florida cases, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v.
Horkheimer, 901 So.2d 329 (Fla.App. 4 Dist 2005) and Chamizo v.
Forman, 933 So.2d 1241 (Fla.App. 3 Dist 2006), they are both
inapposite to the instant action. In the Horkheimer case, the
trial court's initial decision had been reversed because the
plaintiff had obtained a default against State Farm and then
obtained a judgment far in excess of of the relief requested
along with attorney fees entered without notice to State Farm. On
the initial appeal, the judgments were set aside and the case
7

remanded to the trial court. The plaintiff then moved for entry
of judgment and an award of attorney fees and costs, which were
ultimately entered. The Horkheimer Court ruled that since the
prior judgment had been entirely set aside, the time limit on the
motion for costs and fees did not run until a new judgment was
entered, and the motion was therefore timely (though the fee
award was set aside again because it still lacked any foundation
of time spent and rates charged. Id. at p. 331-32.
The Chamizo case involved a question of whether a judgment
which includes an award of attorney fees but reserves the issue
of the amount for later hearing acted as an automatic extension
of

the recently enacted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525,

which required a motion for fees and costs to be filed within
thirty days of the filing of the judgment. The Chamizo Court held
that it did, relying on Florida case law predating the adoption
of R. 1.525. However, the Chamizo decision appears to have been
dead on arrival, since the Florida Supreme Court had just issued
a decision in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d
598 (Fla. 2006) which rejected the reasoning of the Third
District and others in favor of the bright-line reasoning of
other Florida appellate districts. Id. Thus, Chamizo appears to
have no value in Florida and certainly should have no persuasive
effect in light of Utah's "well-settled" law on the timing of a
motion for costs.
C.

Defendants' Assertion That This Is a Case of First

Impression In Utah Is Simply Ridiculous,
Defendants finally assert that because none of the abundant
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case authority cited by Aurora specifically involve a situation
where the prevailing party waited until after an appeal to
request an award of its trial court costs, this is a case of
first impression in Utah. To call this argument of defendants
specious would be giving it far too much credit. Contrary to the
implications of defendants' argument, all of the cases cited by
Aurora as authority for the untimeliness of defendants7
application for costs were faced with the same issue involved
herein: was the prevailing party's application for a trial cost
award timely under the requirements of Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ.
Pro.? There is nothing about the fact that the defendants herein
were REALLY untimely in their application for a trial cost award,
as opposed to just a little untimely, that should persuade our
appellate courts to think that the reasoning of all these cases
cited by Aurora would change because of this immaterial factual
distinction. Could it be that all the judges signing off on these
opinions could have been wrong? Of course not! Had any of these
appellate judges believed that defendants' interpretation of Rule
54(d) was correct or even plausible, they presumably would have
ruled completely contrary to how they actually did rule. Instead
of uniformly ruling that trial cost requests filed more than five
days after the entry of the final judgment under R. 54(a) or (b)
and ordering them stricken, the Utah appellate courts would have
ruled that since an appeal was filed, there was no issue of
timeliness raised. Of course, they did not do so. Further, does
anyone really expect that after any of these Utah decisions cited
by Aurora, the trial court on remand would have entertained a
9

motion to enter a "new final judgment" in order to allow a cost
award contrary to the express holding of the appellate court? Of
course not! Defendants' assertion that this is a case of first
impression in Utah is patently absurd, and a further indication
that defendants' position was and continues to be frivolous.
POINT II
DEPENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY LEGITIMATE FACTS
OR BY UTAH LAW
Defendants arguments as to the issue of whether sanctions
under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro., or various rules of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure would be appropriate under the
circumstances herein do not provide any real factual or legal
support for their position.
Subpoint A of Point II of defendants' brief boils down to a
simple declaration that after a "reasonable" investigation they
"reasonably" believed their claim for costs was proper, and that
since the trial court approved their cost award, it could not
have been a violation of Rule 11. Fortunately for Aurora,
defendants' argument on this matter is not supported by Utah law.
As to the assertion that the trial court's approval of
defendants' trial cost award should alone foreclose any
determination on appeal that Rule 11 was violated, it is contrary
to Utah law. It is established Utah law that whether specific
conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law,
and no deference is accorded the trial court's ruling thereon.
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Taylor v.
Estate of Taylorf 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the
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mere fact that the trial court, for reasons known only to it,
approved defendants trial court costs contrary to "wellestablished" Utah law does not provide any defense to defendants
on the question of whether Rule 11 was violated.
As to defendants' purported "reasonable" belief after their
purported "reasonable" investigation, that issue is to be
determined by an objective standard, not a subjective one. Giffen
v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Although defendants
do not provide any meaningful explanation of what investigation
they conducted to arrive at their belief that their claim for
trial court costs was warranted by existing law, the implication
of their statements is that they only looked at the language of
Rule 54(d) and concluded that they were justified in believing it
was perfectly proper to wait until after the appeal to file for
trial court costs, in spite of such action being contrary to the
express language of R. 54(d)(2). Apparently defense counsel felt
it was not worth their time to actually look at some cases which
interpreted the "well-established" law of the time limit set out
in R. 54(d)(2), and felt confident in their completely
unsupported interpretation of R. 54(d). This is essentially the
"empty head - pure heart" defense which has been rejected by
courts. Thornton v. Wall. 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.
1986)("Rule 11 requires counsel to study the law before
representing its contents to a federal court. An empty head but a
pure heart is no defense."); Chambers v. American Trans Air,
Inc. , 17 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. den. 115 S.Ct. 512, 513
U.S. 1001, 130 L.Ed.2d 419(same). Contrary to defendants7
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apparent position, Aurora believes it is not objectively
reasonable to not look at any case law interpreting this
procedural rule because you claim to be satisfied that your
interpretation of the rule is correct, particularly when that
interpretation is contrary to the express language of the rule.
Further, contrary to defendants7 implication, a

showing of bad

faith is not required to find a violation of Rule 11, but
certainly may be relevant to the severity of sanction imposed.
Next, defendants7 argument in subpart B of Point II of their
brief misconstrues the issue of discretion of a trial court under
Rule 11 analysis. Obviously, since the trial court simply signed
the "new final judgment" and awarded defendants their trial
costs, the trial court never even got to the point of exercising
its discretion, and therefore defendants7 entire discussion about
abuse of discretion is not pertinent to any issue herein.
Finally, defendants7 argument that the appellate court
should not impose sanctions herein construes Rules 33 and 40,
Utah R. App. Pro., too narrowly when they suggest that sanctions
are not warranted herein. As to Rule 33, defendants suggest that
since they are not filing a motion or taking the appeal,
sanctions against them under R. 3 3 are not permitted. Although R.
33(a) does mention only motions or an appeal, subsection (b)
makes clear that the rule also applies to a "brief or other
paper." Defendants7 brief therefore brings them within the
parameters of R. 33. As to Rule 40, Subsection (a) clearly
includes briefs and other papers within the scope of this rule,
which is essentially the appellate equivalent of Rule 11, Utah R.
12

Civ. Pro. It will be up to the appellate court to determine
whether defendants' brief meets the standards set out in Rule
40(a). Aurora believes that in light of the overwhelming, "wellestablished" decisional authority contrary to defendants'
interpretation of R. 54 (d) , Utah R. Civ. Pro., defendants have
proffered no rational basis to justify their arguments in support
of their interpretation, and those arguments fail to meet the
standards set and are frivolous. Thus, defendants are subject to
sanctions under either Rules 33 or 40 if the appellate court
agrees that defendants7 arguments have no merit.
CONCLUSION
The trial court7s action of entering a "new final judgment"
for the sole purpose of allowing defendants their trial court
costs was clearly erroneous under the express language of R.
54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the numerous cases interpreting it.
The trial court further erred in not sanctioning defendants
under Rule 11 for their frivolous argument for the cost award.
The Court should direct the trial court to award Aurora sanctions
against defendants for asserting such frivolous arguments,
awarding Aurora its costs and reasonable attorney fees in amounts
to be determined upon remand.
Further, the Court should award Aurora multiple costs along
with such other sanctions as the Court deems proper under Rules
33 and 40, Utah R. App. Pro., since defendants have continued
asserting their frivolous arguments in this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2007.
Eric P. 'Hartman
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James E. Magleby
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